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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 James Lenegan appeals from the District Court‘s denial of evidentiary motions and 
its judgment of sentence.  We will affirm. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts. 
 In November of 2007, Lenegan was indicted on charges stemming from his role in 
a conspiracy to burglarize pharmacies and distribute stolen drugs.  According to the 
Government, the conspiracy involved at least eleven individuals who, between December 
2002 and June 2005, burglarized thirty-three pharmacies and attempted thirteen more 
burglaries throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.  Lenegan was charged 
with conspiracy and two counts of burglary and drug distribution arising from break-ins at 
the Glen Center Pharmacy in Ambler, Pennsylvania, and the Oxford Valley Pharmacy in 
Levittown, Pennsylvania.  At the close of trial, the jury found Lenegan guilty of 
conspiracy as well as the burglary and distribution counts relating to the Oxford Valley 
Pharmacy burglary.  It found him not guilty of the counts relating to the Glen Center 
Pharmacy. 
II 
 Lenegan challenges five rulings by the District Court, three of which relate to the 
guilt phase, and two of which relate to sentencing.  We address these arguments and the 
applicable standards of review in turn. 
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A 
 Before standing trial in this case, Lenegan was in custody on unrelated charges, 
during which time he participated in a proffer session without counsel present, without 
signing a proffer letter, and without the benefit of Miranda warnings.  Lenegan moved to 
suppress statements made during the proffer session.  The District Court conducted a 
thorough ―totality of the circumstances‖ review and determined that, although the 
statements were inadmissible in the Government‘s case-in-chief because of the Miranda 
violation, they were nevertheless made voluntarily and could be used to rebut contrary 
testimony if Lenegan took the stand at trial.  In this appeal, Lenegan argues his statements 
should have been suppressed for all purposes, including impeachment, because they were 
involuntary.
1
 
 We review de novo the District Court‘s ruling on the voluntariness of a statement 
made to law enforcement, and we review the Court‘s findings of fact for clear error.  
United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). 
                                                 
1 
Lenegan does not dispute that un-Mirandized statements may be used to impeach, 
as long as they were made voluntarily.  See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307–08 
(1985) (―Despite the fact that patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda 
must be excluded from the prosecution‘s case, the presumption of coercion does not bar 
their use for impeachment purposes on cross-examination.‖ (citing Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222 (1971))); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975). 
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 We evaluate the voluntariness of Lenegan‘s statements based on the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether ―the confession was the product of an essentially free 
and unconstrained choice by its maker, that it was the product of a rational intellect and a 
free will and that the appellant‘s will was not overborne.‖  Id. at 289 (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Relevant circumstances include: ―police coercion; the 
length of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the defendant‘s maturity; 
education; physical condition; and mental health,‖ as well as whether police ―advise[d] 
the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present.‖  Id. (quoting 
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693–94 (1993)) (citations omitted). 
 In its ruling on Lenegan‘s motion to suppress, the District Court made the 
following findings of fact, none of which is clearly erroneous.  At the time of the proffer 
session, Lenegan was forty years old and in good physical and mental health.  The proffer 
session was held in a conference room, lasted for one hour, and terminated when Lenegan 
requested they break for lunch.  As to Lenegan‘s education level, experience, and 
maturity, the Court found that he is a high school graduate who has had extensive 
interaction with the criminal justice system.  Moreover, the law enforcement officers 
present during the session were in plain clothes and carried no visible weapons.  Finally, 
the Assistant United States Attorney made concerted efforts to have Lenegan‘s attorney 
present, and when it was apparent that counsel would not attend, the AUSA both allowed 
Lenegan to speak with counsel on the phone and explained the nature of the proffer 
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session himself.  Based on these facts, we agree with the District Court‘s determination 
that Lenegan‘s statements during the proffer session were voluntary and were thus 
admissible for impeachment purposes. 
B 
 Before trial, Lenegan stipulated to the basic facts surrounding forty-four of the 
burglaries and attempted burglaries.  The stipulation contained anticipated testimony from 
upwards of eighty pharmacy owners and responding police officers, who would have 
testified as to the occurrence of the burglaries and the amount of loss from each.  The 
stipulation did not contain information about any of the alleged perpetrators, including 
Lenegan.  After Lenegan signed the stipulation, it came to light that his attorney had a 
conflict of interest because he had represented one of the victim pharmacies in connection 
with an insurance claim arising out of the burglary.  Lenegan refused to waive the 
conflict, and new counsel was appointed.  Five days before trial, Lenegan moved to 
withdraw from the stipulation, arguing that he had not understood it and that his consent 
to it was tainted because he had conflicted counsel at the time.  The District Court excised 
the portion of the stipulation relating to the pharmacy that had precipitated the conflict, 
but rejected Lenegan‘s motion in all other respects.  Lenegan renews his arguments on 
appeal. 
 ―We review a district court‘s decision to bind a party to its stipulation under an 
abuse of discretion standard.‖  Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 616 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
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Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 We have noted that ―[a]llowing parties easily to set aside or modify stipulations 
would defeat th[eir] purpose, wasting judicial resources and undermining future 
confidence in such agreements,‖ and ―[t]hus ‗[i]t is a well-recognized rule of law that 
valid stipulations entered into freely and fairly, and approved by the court, should not be 
lightly set aside.‘‖  Id. (quoting Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 307 (3d 
Cir. 1972)).  When deciding whether it would be manifestly unjust to bind a party to a 
stipulation, we consider factors such as: ―(1) the effect of the stipulation on the party 
seeking to withdraw the stipulation; (2) the effect on the other parties to the litigation; (3) 
the occurrence of intervening events since the parties agreed to the stipulation; and (4) 
whether evidence contrary to the stipulation is substantial.‖  Id. at 617–18 (citations 
omitted). 
 Before the District Court ruled on Lenegan‘s motion, both Lenegan and his 
counsel testified about their discussions concerning the stipulation.  Because the Court 
found counsel‘s testimony more credible than Lenegan‘s testimony, the Court determined 
that Lenegan knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily agreed to enter the stipulation.  The 
Court then examined each of the four factors discussed in Waldorf, and concluded that 
they weighed in favor of enforcing the stipulation.  Most notably, the Court found that 
Lenegan was not prejudiced in any way not already contemplated when he entered the 
waiver, whereas the Government would have been prejudiced by a last-minute decision 
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forcing it to present witnesses to substantiate all of the stipulated facts.  In light of the 
District Court‘s thorough consideration of the competing interests at issue, we hold that 
the Court acted well within its discretion. 
C 
 Before trial, the Government filed a motion under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
to introduce evidence of seven uncharged commercial burglaries and two uncharged 
residential burglaries that Lenegan allegedly committed with various co-conspirators.  
Lenegan objected, arguing that the testimony was inadmissible because it was not direct 
or intrinsic evidence supporting the conspiracy count and, as to the other counts, it 
constituted propensity evidence.  Lenegan also argued that the evidence would be 
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  The District Court agreed with 
Lenegan as to the risk of unfair prejudice that may result from testimony about residential 
burglaries; however, the Court also found that the testimony about commercial burglaries 
was admissible under Rule 404(b)—i.e., to show intent, knowledge, preparation or plan, 
identity, or lack of mistake.
2
  Moreover, the Court found that under the Rule 403 
                                                 
2 
The District Court also found it was direct and extrinsic evidence of the alleged 
conspiracy; however, the Government now concedes that after our decision in United 
States v. Green—which limited what evidence qualifies as ―intrinsic‖ to that which (1) 
―directly proves the charged offense‖ or (2) relates to ―uncharged acts performed 
contemporaneously with the charged crime . . . if they facilitate[d] the commission of the 
charged crime,‖ 617 F.3d 233, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)—the testimony in this case would only be admissible under 
Rule 404(b), not as direct or intrinsic evidence of the charged conspiracy.  Appellee‘s Br. 
at 59 n.21. 
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balancing test, the risk of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the 
commercial burglary testimony.  Several times throughout the testimony, the Court read 
to the jury a limiting instruction that explained the limited purposes for which the 
evidence was introduced and could be considered. 
 We will reverse the District Court‘s evidentiary rulings only if it abused its 
discretion, i.e., if its decision is ―arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable . . . where no 
reasonable person would adopt [its] view.‖  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We review de novo 
the District Court‘s legal interpretation of the Rules of Evidence, including whether 
certain testimony is admissible under Rule 404(b).  Id. 
 According to Rule 404(b), ―[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith[,]‖ but ―[i]t may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.‖  We have elaborated on the Rule‘s requirements: 
To satisfy Rule 404(b), evidence of other acts must (1) have a proper 
evidentiary purpose, (2) be relevant under Rule 402, (3) satisfy Rule 403 
(i.e., not be substantially more prejudicial than probative), and (4) be 
accompanied by a limiting instruction, when requested pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 105, that instructs the jury not to use the evidence for an 
improper purpose. See United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 
2001); United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 294-95 (3d Cir. 1999).  
―Other acts‖ evidence satisfies the first two requirements if it is ―probative 
of a material issue other than character.‖ Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 685, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). In other words, there 
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must be an articulable chain of inferences, ―‗no link of which may be the 
inference that the defendant has the propensity to commit the crime 
charged,‘‖ connecting the evidence to a material fact. Becker v. ARCO 
Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 191 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that the ―chain of logic 
must include no link involving an inference that a bad person is disposed to 
do bad acts‖). 
 
United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320–21 (3d Cir. 2002) (footnotes omitted).  Rule 
403 states that ―evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.‖  The Advisory Committee Note defines 
―unfair prejudice‖ as ―an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.‖  See also United States v. Blyden, 
964 F.2d 1375, 1378 (3d Cir. 1992) (―Any evidence suggesting guilt is ‗prejudicial‘ to a 
defendant and obviously Rule 403 is not intended to exclude all such matter.  Rather, the 
focus must be on unfairness in the sense that the proponent would secure an advantage 
that results from the likelihood the evidence would persuade by illegitimate means.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
 The District Court made sound legal and factual findings at each step of the Cross 
analysis.  It determined that the testimony of alleged co-conspirators about Lenegan‘s 
other commercial burglaries committed in furtherance of the conspiracy provided strong 
evidence of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and 
absence of mistake or accident, and it was therefore relevant because it was probative of 
issues other than character.  The Court also discussed the probative value of the evidence 
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versus the risk of unfair prejudice, finding that testimony relating to uncharged 
commercial burglaries would not inflame jurors‘ passions as would evidence of 
residential burglaries, which the Court, in its sound discretion, deemed inadmissible.  
Finally, the Court drafted a four-page limiting instruction to guide the jury in its 
consideration of the evidence.  That the jury acquitted Lenegan on the charges relating to 
one of the two alleged burglaries strongly suggests that the jury heeded that instruction.  
The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of 
uncharged commercial burglaries. 
D 
 At sentencing, the Government moved for a three- or four-point upward departure 
under § 4A1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or Guidelines) based 
on the inadequacy of Lenegan‘s criminal history category.  The parties agreed that 
Lenegan‘s thirty-six criminal history points placed him twenty-three points above the 
minimum needed to qualify for Category VI under the Guidelines.  According to the 
Government, Lenegan had accumulated thirteen criminal history points by 1992, and 
although most of his crimes were non-violent property crimes, his persistent recidivism 
warranted an increase in his sentence.  Lenegan argued that his crimes were almost 
entirely non-violent property offenses and that, even if sentenced within the Guidelines, 
he would be over sixty years old by the time of his release and would thus not be a threat 
to offend again.  The District Court rejected Lenegan‘s arguments and departed upwards 
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from his Guideline range of 168 to 210 months.  Accounting for a two-point departure, 
Lenegan‘s range became 210 to 262 months, and the Court imposed a 220 month 
sentence. 
 We review de novo the District Court‘s ―interpretation and application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines,‖ whereas ―[f]indings of facts are measured by the clearly 
erroneous test.‖  United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 
United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1994) and United States v. Hillstrom, 
988 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 Section 4A1.3(a)(1) of the Guidelines permits the sentencing court to depart 
upwards ―[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant‘s criminal history category 
substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant‘s criminal history or the 
likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.‖  ―In determining whether an 
upward departure from Criminal History Category VI is warranted, the court should 
consider that the nature of the prior offenses rather than simply their number is often 
more indicative of the seriousness of the defendant‘s criminal record.‖  Id. cmt. n. 2(B).  
We have also noted, but not adopted, the Second Circuit‘s approach to § 4A1.3 
departures, which is that: ―[O]nly the most compelling circumstances-for example, prior 
misconduct accompanied by wanton cruelty would justify a 4A departure above Category 
VI.‖  United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 1114 (quoting United States v. Coe, 891 
F.2d 405, 413 (2d Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 In explaining its decision to depart upwards in this case, the District Court 
considered the nature of Lenegan‘s prior offenses, noting that most, but not all, were 
property crimes.  Even accounting for the non-violent nature of the offenses, the Court 
still concluded that Lenegan‘s criminal history category underrepresented the seriousness 
of his criminal background because his record contained a ―staggering number[] of . . . 
prior convictions‖—i.e., ―32 sentences on a total of 81 criminal charges.‖ 
 We see no reason to disturb the District Court‘s discretionary decision.  Nothing in 
the Guidelines forbids a sentencing court from considering the number of prior crimes 
under § 4A1.3, and although ―the nature of the prior offenses rather than simply their 
number is often more indicative of the seriousness of the defendant's criminal record,‖ the 
number is still worthy of consideration.  In Lenegan‘s case, the number of previous 
crimes, not to mention the number of parole and probation revocations, supports the 
District Court‘s judgment. 
E 
 Finally, Lenegan moved for a downward adjustment pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2, 
claiming he played a minimal or minor role in the conspiracy.  He argued to the District 
Court that he was convicted of only one burglary out of more than forty committed or 
attempted.  He also claimed the drug quantities stolen during his robberies were much 
lower than the total quantities stolen by several other participants.  The District Court 
rejected this argument, finding that, although Lenegan was not a major participant, he was 
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also more culpable than others and that, because his Guidelines range was based solely on 
the drug quantities from his own robberies, it properly accounted for his role. 
 We apply to the Court‘s denial of Lenegan‘s motion for downward departure the 
same standard of review we applied to its decision to grant the Government‘s motion for 
an upward departure.  Yeaman, 194 F.3d at 456. 
 Pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2, a defendant‘s offense level is decreased by two, three, 
or four levels if the defendant played a minor role, minimal role, or something in 
between.  The four-point ―minimal participant‖ reduction ―is intended to cover defendants 
who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group,‖ 
and ―[i]t is intended that [it] will be used infrequently.‖  § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 4.  The two-point 
―minor participant‖ reduction, on the other hand, applies to a defendant ―who is less 
culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.‖ 
 Id. cmt. n. 5.  ―The determination whether to apply [§ 3B1.2] involves a determination 
that is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.‖  Id. cmt. n.3(C).  ―The 
district courts are allowed broad discretion in applying this section and their rulings are 
left largely undisturbed by the courts of appeal.‖  United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 
236, 238 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the District Court provided an 
adequate rationale for its decision to deny Lenegan a mitigating-role reduction.  
Considering the jury‘s verdict as to one of the burglaries, as well as trial testimony about 
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Lenegan‘s role in seven others, the Court found that he was ―in no respect substantially 
less culpable than the average participant‖ and was in fact ―equally culpable with at least  
five of the other participants.‖  Because these findings are not clearly erroneous, we hold 
that the District Court did not err in rejecting Lenegan‘s motion pursuant to § 3B1.2. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in all 
respects. 
